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ABOUT FUNDAMENTALISM

- The virulent campaign against Islamic Communities in Belgium after the demonstration against the American raid on Libya feeds xenophobia and racism.
- Which are the Islamist currents in Turkey and what is their influence on Turkish immigrants in Europe?
- Where does the danger come from? From Islamists? Or from the neo-fascist Grey Wolves who exploit with the Belgian and Turkish authorities' blessings the religious sentiments of immigrant workers?
- A spectacular convention of Grey Wolves in Antwerp in the presence of diplomatic missions and political leaders from Turkey.
- Why does the Turkish regime involve Moslem workers within the Turkish Islamic Foundation, in which Grey Wolves are strongly represented.
- The failure of CRI which had been formed with support from unions and Belgian democratic organizations in view of preventing the recruitment of immigrant Moslem workers by repressive regimes and extreme-right movements.

"I am shocked by the show of anti-American hate which was expressed Sunday in the streets of Brussels, which went against the feelings of all Belgians in solidarity with our allies and who condemn terrorism and the States which support it."

These are the words from the Belgian Minister of Justice Jean Gol himself, who was questioning a demonstration organized in Brussels by Arab progressive organizations and supported by the National Action Committee for Peace and Development (CNAPD) on April 20, 1986 to protest against the American raid on Libya.

Gol, seizing this occasion to justify his anti-immigrant policy and his hostility against the rights acquired by foreigners in Belgium, raised his voice provocatively: "I am worried by the scenes on television, which one is more used to seeing in the streets of Teheran rather than those of Brussels. The presence of fanatical groups in our country necessitates particular vigilance and action. I can assure you that the government authorities show this vigilance in view of preserving public security at all time."

The Belgian mass-media, illustrating and commenting on this demonstration, chose the scenes where portraits of Khomeiny and Colonel Khadafi and woman in tchadour appeared on a large scale. They furthermore immediately launched a virulent campaign against "fundamentalism in Belgium," while leaving in silence the real substance of this demonstration.

In fact, the American raid on Libya, whatever its motive, was a criminal act which deserves categorical

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TO OUR READERS

Last few issues of our monthly bulletin have appeared with an unusual delay. This is for two reasons: On the one hand intensive works for the publication of "Black Book On The Militarist Democracy In Turkey", and on the other, the unforeseen delays due to the change of our local.

After the summer holiday, all our activities: documentation, publication, permanent education and creative ateliers, will restart in our new local, in the same street, with a more diversified programme.

Bulletins of June, July and August 1986 will be edited in this new local and will appear at the end of the summer holiday. From September 1986 on, the publication of monthly bulletins will be regular again.

New address: INFO-TURK, 38 Rue des Eburons - 1040 Brussels.

condemnation by all peace partisans and not only by North African immigrants. It is in face of the immobility of the Belgian Peace movement, which doubtlessly would have reacted against a similar act of aggression if it had been the work of one of the adverse-military-bloc countries against a Western or Third World country, that the North African progressives were obliged to take the initiative to condemn this undeniable act of aggression.

Faced with this situation, the appearance of certain images on the TV screen or in the press and which pleased neither the mass-media or the leaders of the country is only a detail. In whichever demonstration, one can note the infiltration of groups whose presence is not desired by the organizers. But in a democratic country, no one can reproach the organizers for such intrusions. Moreover, whatever may be their political, ideological or philosophical leaning and whatever may be their way of dress, all the nationals of the country or countries threatened by military aggression from a super-power have the right to demonstrate publicly their opposition to violations of international rights. It is obvious that for the time-being the most targeted countries by the United States are Iran and Libya. Consequently, it is quite normal that nationals or sympathizers of these countries participate in such a protest demonstration.

In principle, the residents of Belgium, whether citizens or foreigners, are equal before Belgian laws. Without committing an act against the Penal Code, no one can be accused or reproached. Shouting slogans against an aggressive super power or peacefully carrying images of the countries threatened by this power are not crimes in themselves if they are not accompanied by acts of violence.

Even *La Libre Belgique* of April 22, 1986, which quotes Gol's statement, indicates that "under the objective circumstances of the Fundamentalist Islamic demonstration, one has learned that no violence was noted by the security forces (no fights, no breaking of shop windows) which consequently has not gone on to make any inquiries; that the only non-sanctioned infractions noted were the many insults to a foreign Head of State (namely, President Ronald Reagan, referred to as murderer)."

If one remembers the many times, where, in the streets of Brussels, scornful slogans have been hurled at leaders of big powers (particularly at the time of their interventions in Vietnam, Chile, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia), one will easily understand that this infraction is not at all without precedent. If the demonstrators of April 20 are accused of insulting a foreign Head of State, all the Belgian and immigrant democrats who demonstrate against the repressive regimes in Chile or Turkey, by hurling scornful slogans, can be accused under the pretext.

In fact, what the mass-media and certain leaders such as Gol did after this demonstration is a banal manipulation aimed at stirring prejudices against immigration and more particularly against the North African and Turkish communities.

"FUNDAMENTALISM" IN BELGIUM

This does not mean that in Belgium there does not exist a phenomenon baptized "Moslem fundamentalism." But fundamentalism is not a line of thought proper to Islam. Fundamentalism is a doctrine which tends to support the totality of a system or a religion and an attitude which rejects all evolution. Such doctrines or attitudes can be found in whatever religion or whatever philosophical or ideological family.

The history of Christianity is itself full of many

examples of fundamentalism. Even today, in this time of great progress, in industrialised countries such as Belgium, it is not exceptional to see Catholic fundamentalists denying any opening or adaptation of the Church to social progress, refusing any kind of dialogue with other religions, above all with Islamic or Jewish religions. They even go to the point of allying themselves with tyrannical regimes under the banner of fighting against revolutionary or progressive currents. It is neither exceptional that Catholic fundamentalists are the most ardent supporters of all discriminatory measures against non-Christian foreigners in Belgium. Also it is not rare to find Christian fundamentalists, who, while denying freedom of religion for Moslem immigrants, work to recruit their children to their cause, using socio-cultural and schooling means.

Fortunately, it is a case of minorities who cannot prevent the implementation of concertation of the different components of Belgium's population, and progress towards a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society in the European capital.

One must be aware that, according to the last census done in Belgium by the National Statistical Institute, on March 1, 1981, the number of nationals from Islamic countries was up to 186,387 (122,800 Maghrebins and 63,587 Turks) while this figure was 68,428 on December 31, 1970, and only 1,187 at the end of 1961. If the Moslem population altogether forms only 1.9 pc of the total of the Kingdom's, it represents more than 7.9 pc in Brussels. These figures do not take into account the presence of people under Moslem obedience such as Albanians, Afghans, Pakistanis, Senegalese or Belgians, present in minority on Belgian territory. Thus, Islam has become the second religion in Belgium after Christianity.

This fact demands that the Belgian authorities and the mass-media have to become involved with the problem of the Islamic community with a more realistic and constructive vision. If anti-Islamic utterings continue under the pretext of fighting against Islamic fundamentalism, that will doubtlessly provoke the rise and mainstream of Islamic fundamentalism on the whole Moslem population.

"FUNDAMENTALISM" IN TURKEY

A question which comes up very often: Does Islamic fundamentalism constitute a serious danger such as it produced in Iran? A Dutch sociologist, Mr. Martin van Bruinessen who did several studies on this problem in Turkey, says "no" to this question in these terms: "Up to now, Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey has remained a marginal phenomenon. The press exaggerates it sometimes, but it is not a serious political danger. An Islamic revolution as in Iran is unimaginable in Turkey for different reasons. It seems well that in the immediate future, more people will concentrate more and more on Islam as essence of their cultural identity. Obviously the growing criticism of the 'materialist' West and the 'Communist' East will make Islam more attractive as a symbol of proper identity. And if the activities of left-wing political organizations and trade unions are still impossible, it is not at all out of the question that social protest will be made under the banner of Islam."

After having been eclipsed for some decades under Kemalist rule, Islam has shown itself since the fifties in all areas of Turkish society.

Atatürk's reforms were aimed at making Turkey an industrial state as quickly as possible, socially and economically developed, modern and independent. All the obstacles to development had to be beaten

down, and many of them were associated with Islam. Most of the Kemalist measures were not immediately directed against popular faith but against the political aspiration of Islam. First of all, the Caliphate was dismantled. Almost at the same, one suppressed the function of Seyhülislam (Islamic spiritual chief), and with the latter disappeared the illusion that the State's decisions would first of all be controlled by the *Charîku* (Islamic law). In its place, one founded the Directorate of religious affairs, an instrument which was going to allow the State to control religion, and not the reverse.

After several Western reforms, Islam became a simple individual affair. Furthermore, to avoid possible resistance in the future, one set up an ambitious education programme and an active spreading of Islam in a lay version.

However, the secularization of the State and the suppression of Islamic institutions were not accompanied and supported by socio-economic reforms which could improve the conditions of life for people. Moreover, the banning of political leftist parties, unions and democratic organizations pushed the discontented masses into clandestine religious groupings and superstitious practices.

After the Second World War, when political pluralism was introduced, the masses' wishes suddenly took on enormous importance. In the country, where 75 percent of the population lived, restoration of Islam was the most emotional desire. After some months in existence, the political parties of the Left and the unions were once more banned and Islam remained the only alternative current against Kemalism. From this moment, all the political parties speculated on Islamic sentiments. Even the Kemalist CHP weakened its secularization programme, trying in vain to keep some votes from the Moslems.

In 1950, when the Democrat Party had taken power, one of the first measures was the re-introduction of the prayer call in Arabic. The DP also introduced again religious broadcasts on State radio, and stimulated the construction and restoration of mosques. The authorities became much more tolerant with regards to the order of faith.

The three military interventions hardly affected the process of reestablishing Islam. The officers who overthrew the DP under the banner of a return to Kemalism in 1960, let it be understood, some months later, that their action was not against the relative liberalization on the religious scale. The second military intervention of 1971, except for the banning of a small Islamic party, brought no restriction to the process of Islamisation, although all the Leftist parties suffered unprecedented repression.

The years of 1973-80 constitute the period of the politisation of Islam in Turkey. The National Salvation Party MSP of Necmeddin Erbakan, with support from the conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie, rapidly organized itself and became the third big political party in the country. Thanks to its key position at the bargainings on forming governmental coalitions and its participation in several governments, the MSP allowed the Islamic movement to be one of the most important components in political life.

The oil crisis and the Iranian revolution, they also, played a significant role in the rise of Islam again in Turkey. The successive governments of this period, whatever their ideological or political tendency, were obliged to give concessions to Islamic countries in exchange for oil imports.

However, the politisation of Islam by the MSP was not a threat. In spite of its collaboration with other rightist or extreme-right groups, the MSP demonstrated partisanship for a pluralist democracy and

defended the interests of the masses against the offensive of big capital.

The most worrying was the neo-fascist movement led by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) of former colonel Turkes. Exploiting anti-Communist, anti-Western and anti-reformist prejudices, the MHP could pit a part of the Islamic population against the progressives, even against the adherents of a minority Islamic sect, the Alevites.

The bloody terror of the MHP's Grey Wolves took on pogrom dimensions twice: In December 1978, some thousand Sunnites, incited by MHP activists, attacked the Alevite quarters in the town of Kahramanmaraş, murdering more than one hundred people and sacking all the houses, stores and offices belonging to this community and to progressive people. In July 1980, another attack of the same kind was repeated in the town of Corum.

The Junta which took power on September 12, 1980, while aiming at Left and democratic organizations, claimed to be equally repugnant with regards to chauvinist or fundamentalist extreme-right but that only in the end to justify its putsch in presenting itself as a referee above all kinds of extremism.

Although the military justice began some political cases against neo-fascist and Islamic parties, some months later, all the leaders of these parties were freed. Moreover, in the new political structure, the activists of these parties were well infiltrated in State apparatus as well as in the Motherland Party (ANAP), which has been in power since 1983. What is more, the neo-fascists and the fundamentalists constituted their new political parties, respectively the *Nationalist Labour Party* (MCP) and the *Welfare Party* (RP), with the active support of former leaders of these currents who have been excluded from political life for a period of ten years.

Although they pretend to be the heirs of Kemalism, the military, in the aim of recuperating the effective militants from these two currents, took a series of measures, quite denying the principle of State secularity.

General Evren, in all his talks, alluded to the Coran's texts to justify his anti-democratic arguments. The military regime as well as the ANAP power accelerated opening towards Islamic countries in view of developing economic and trade rapports with these countries. General Evren, his prime ministers and ministers participate very often in meetings of Islamic countries and commute between many capitals in the Arab world.

In practice, it is the first time in the modern history of Turkey that religious courses in secondary teaching have been made obligatory while before they were facultative. Furthermore, beside the official courses, clandestine courses still flourish more than before.

FUNDAMENTALIST REACTIONS

When one speaks of Islam, one must immediately stress that it is not at all monolithic. First of all, the two opposing sects of Islam, the Sunnites and Alevites, are well represented in Turkish society. Although the Sunnites form the absolute majority, the Alevites are the biggest religious minority in Turkey. Their number is not well known. Actually it is placed at about 10 million out of a population of 50 million. There are some of them who speak Turkish, other speak Kurdish. This sect can be compared to messianist movements who, at the end of the Middle Age in Europe, wanted the ideal state on earth. From the 14th and 15th century the Alevites revolted several times

against the despotic State dominated by the Sunnites and also led several movements of social protest. In general, the Alevite Community, in spite of their parenthood with the Shiites of Iran from the historical point of view, are more open and more democratic than the Sunnites. That is probably because of their minority status in Turkey, while the Shiites have always been the majority in Iran. In modern history, the Alevites first supported the Kemalist reforms and afterwards left-wing movements.

While the Sunnits hold the Directorate of Religious Affairs in their hands, beside this form officially tolerated, a rebirth of Islamic tendencies which are much more radical develops along parallel lines. The latter completely reject secularism and would like a return to the source.

The first tendency which gave rise to talk of it by some spectacular actions was the order of *Ticani* dervishes. Towards 1950, members exploded several busts of Atatürk. The government then reacted in so brutal and effective a fashion that the *Ticani* disappeared definitively.

The most striking Islamist group was that associated, in the last decades, with the MSP: *The National Vision* (Milli Görüş). This tendency represented a specifically economic interest group which strongly opposes the policy of development dependent on Western capitalism. This is a combination of an Islamist vision and an ambition for better economic and political cooperation with the rest of the Islamic world. These past years, it has not hid its admiration for the Islamic revolution in Iran. Instead of attacking Turkey's State system frontally, the National Vision tries to change things by participating in the government.

However the MSP, or the National Vision, is contested by various tendencies, notably by the *Nurcu* and the *Süleymancı*. Both exist in organised forms since the fifties. They are based on the ideas of two religious figures: Saidi Nursi and Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan.

Saidi Nursi, dead in 1960, was a Kurd, brought up in Medreses (religious schools) and in dervishes orders. He was also active in Kurdish nationalist movement to 1923. He wrote the *Risale-i Nur* (the Pamphlet of Light), a work from which the *Nurcu* take their name. This movement, which according to its own saying, has some millions of disciples, is composed of groups of persons who study the *Risale* together, they read almost nothing else. The *Nurcu* supported the MSP in 1973, but later, the Justice Party (AP).

The *Süleymancı* are still more conservative than the *Nurcu*. Disciples of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, dead in 1959, form a sect which is linked to a part of the order of *Naksibendi* dervishes. They believe very strongly that the end of time is near. The road that Süleyman showed will be the only way to deliverance. Courses of the Coran were actually the most important activity in which Süleyman was occupied during his life. They have their own religious education. Süleyman and his disciples hardly liked secularised Islam as it is propagated by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and they boycotted all the official religion schools.

The fact that the AP offered them a number of seats in Parliament in 1977, in exchange for their support, can be an indication of their popular base.

The *Süleymancı* have never openly pitted themselves against the secular State system, perhaps so as not to endanger their representation in the Parliament. However, they are especially very active against everything of Left, whether it concerns Ecevit or unions or Alevites. The latter are considered renegades, worse than atheists, and worse still than Communists. At

first glance, it seems paradoxical that the *Süleymancı* are also opposed to the MSP and that they negatively criticize the Iranian revolution. The reason for that comes from their anti-communism feelings and the anguish the Soviet Union brings them. They believe that a strong America is the only guarantee against Communism. In that, they are very close to Saudi conceptions.

The Islamist tendencies that are the most known are, apart from the National Vision and perhaps a part of the *Nurcu*, traditionalist and reactionary. They revolt against social changes and desire the restoration of a very idealized past. This is strongly linked to the social basis of their faction, which consists especially of people who feel threatened by socio-economic developments (little bourgeoisie) or those who already feel lost and are seeking stability (villagers who went to big cities or even to industrialised countries). It is that which started their relationship with the fascist movement, which supports itself on the same groupings.

One cannot describe all the Islamists thus. There are also (although they do not seem to be well organized) those who wish to introduce deep social changes. They, too, refuse secularism, and they want Islam to be the basis of social order; however, they reject all the reactionary interpretations of Islam. For them, Islam is the religion of social and economic justice, in which there is no place for exploitation of one person by another. Islam is the source of inspiration for revolt against oppression, and thus also against imperialism. More and more, students, especially from technical faculties, become interested in Islam and "Islamic socialism."

In short, Islamic groups represent a considerable portion of the people. But one of the reasons which explain the full Islamist expansion is doubtlessly the exclusion of Left-wing movements from the political scene. Above all, young people who suffer social injustice, lack of educational opportunities and employment, socio-cultural upheaval brought about by the changing of production rapports, adhere, in the absence of a Left-wing alternative, to Islamist tendencies.

However the Islamists are too little in number (10 to 15 percent of the population) and especially too divided among themselves to be a real threat. One should not expect an Iranian-style revolution in Turkey. Their political significance remains marginal. The restoration of the *Chariâa* as the dominant law is not an ideal wished for by most Turks, and that will hardly change in the future. Probably the significance of being Moslem, as a means of Cultural identification, will increase.

As was noted by sociologist Van Bruinessen, "for a long time the Turks have considered themselves as a part of Europe. They are realizing more and more that they are also very well a part of the Middle East. Events in this region will influence Turkey more and more, and because of that, it seems inevitable that Islam's political interest, "Leftist" as well as "Rightist" variations, will still increase.

"FUNDAMENTALISM" IN IMMIGRATION

As we explained in the main article of this edition, Islamist tendencies are propagated among people who already feel lost and are seeking identity and stability (villagers who moved to large cities or even industrialized countries).

Forming a part of this last category, Moslim immigrants from Turkey constitute fertile ground for all Islamist seeds as well as for the neo-fascist movement which exploits well the religious and nationalist sentiments of people outside their countries.

"GREY WOLVES" IN EUROPE

One must recall that Turkish immigration is the most recent in Europe, compared to other immigrant communities. It first of all began to organize in the context of initiatives aimed at construction of mosques and assuring the repatriation of the bodies of the dead. In the beginning, this was where lay the most urgent initiatives for Turkish nationals in a country whose religion and customs were quite different.

Beside their initial tasks, these associations also tried to help their adherents in their daily problems such the translation of papers in the language of the host country, and they played the role of intermediary in their relations with the local authorities.

With the arrival of Turkish workers' children in the context of keeping families together, and to assure their attachment to religious values, these associations began to organize courses of the Coran by bringing "imams" or "hodjas" from Turkey.

It is in this way that Islamist and nationalist tendencies seized the occasion and began to send their propagandists to European countries. In fact, the massive arrival of Turkish immigrants to Europe coincides with the rise of neo-fascist and fundamentalist movements in their countries of origin.

While the Grey Wolves of the neo-fascist MHP organized in the *Foyers of Ideal* (Ulku Ocakları) and recruited Turkish believers, two main Islamist Turkish tendencies, *The National Vision* (Milli Görüs), linked with the MSP, and the *Süleymanci* began to organize first in West Germany, and stretched to the Netherlands and Belgium.

The mosques teaching courses of the Coran do not all belong to one of the three influences; however, the great percentages confirms it all the same.

Leaving the Grey Wolves until the end of this study, let us first go to the two currents called: the National Vision and the Süleymanci.

The National Vision rose rapidly thanks to the MSP's participation in successive coalition governments. The commuting done by MSP ministers or deputies between Ankara and European capitals served well to legitimise this movement among immigrant workers. Organisations of the National Vision, especially after the Iranian revolution, mobilised their members to demonstrate in the streets of big European cities to show their sympathy with the Khomeiny regime and also to revindicate the lifting of obstacles to the propagation of Islam. The daily paper Milli Görüs of this movement is sold in all European cities and several mosques, under their control, propagate the national vision.

While the National Vision was legitimised in Turkey thanks to the MSP, and after the coup, thanks to the Well-fare Party (RP), the *Süleymanci* remained a movement which the Turkish authorities distrusted the most. Europe is the best ground of action for them to gain influence. For that, they use some willing Europeans who want to do something for the Moslems and who do not realize that the Süleymanci are not the representatives of simple Moslems but a fundamentalist sect. The great organizer is Harun Resit Tüylüoğlu, who has lived in Köln since 1975. Although the Süleymanci do not believe that a Moslem can be the friend of Christians or Jews, Tüylüoğlu has a very close relationship with cardinal of Köln Höffner, and with CDU member of Parliament, Albrecht Hassinger. Since 1978, the Süleymanci have had their own weekly: *Anadolu*. The Süleymanci also have much influence in a political organization, close to the Justice Party (AP): *Hür-Türk* (Free Turk), which has privileged relationships with the CDU. The Süleymanci have their own mosques and Coranic schools.

Among the movements pretending to be defender of Islam, the most dangerous is doubtlessly the *Grey Wolves*, who are organized in the *Foyers of Ideal* (Ulku Ocakları).

These neo-fascist activists of former colonel Türkes, MHP, are well organized in all the host countries of Turkish immigrants. They had first constituted local sections of the MHP, but at the time, the Constitutional Court of Turkey had warned the MHP that it would definitely be banned if it did not suppress these sections abroad. By this, from 1977, the Grey Wolves dissolved the MHP sections and have organized in parallel associations such as the "*Foyer of Ideal*" or the "*Turkish Cultural Association*" (Türk Kültür Derneği).

After several visits by the Chief Turkes to European countries, all these Grey Wolves associations regrouped under the direction of the TURK-FEDERASYON, seated in Frankfurt (FRG).

While the Grey Wolves in Turkey, with support from the Counter-Guerilla Organization of the Turkish Army carried on violence in Turkey to prepare the motive for a military coup, their companions in Europe committed several acts of violence to intimidate Turkish workers of the Left. (All the details of the Grey Wolves' terrorism in Europe was given in the June' 85 edition of Info-Türk).

After the 1980 military coup, following the dissolution of the MHP and the arrest of their leaders in Turkey, the Grey Wolves established in Europe reduced their public activities for passing this period without disturbances.

However, the attempt on the Pope's life by Grey Wolf, Mehmet Ali Agca, in 1981, and the implication of the names of several MHP and Türk-Federasyon leaders in this obscure affair, have been a stain on this movement.

During this period, Grey Wolves organizations devoted themselves to the organization of religious services such as mosques or Coranic courses and the recruiting of Turkish believers to swell their ranks.

To deceive public opinion, many Grey Wolves organizations changed their names. For example, in Belgium, Grey Wolves organizations have rebaptised themselves "The Association of Turco-Islamic Culture," and all these associations are grouped since April 1984 within the Federation of Turco-Islamic associations, or *Türk-Islam Federasyonu* (Turco-Islamic Federation).

The president of this federation, Salahattin Saygin, is also a member of the Council of administration of the Türk-Federasyon, grouping all the "Grey Wolves" organizations in Europe.

After the release of Colonel Türkes and other neo-fascist leaders in Turkey, the Grey Wolves in Europe showed their teeth again. While Türkes supports a new neo-fascist formation, the Nationalist Labour Party (MCP), and makes public declarations, the Grey Wolves in Europe organize spectacular meetings very often in the presence of diplomatic representatives from Turkey and leaders of various political parties of the Right.

SPECTACULAR GREY WOLVES' CONGRESS

The general assembly of the Türk-Islam Federasyonu in Belgium is the latest example. This meeting of Grey Wolves was made on April 26, 1986, in Antwerp in the presence of the former vice-president of the ANAP, the right-wing party presently in power, and the Consul of the Republic of Turkey in Belgium.

In spite of protests from Turkish and Belgian democratic organizations, the municipal authorities refused to ban the holding of the congress. Thus, after a five-year interval, the Grey Wolves were again given the blessing of the Turkish and Belgian authorities.

In fact, the legitimization of Grey Wolves organizations had already begun four years ago. The military Junta, taking account of the fact that all the political objectives of the neo-fascist party were identical to the ones of the military had ordered assemble to all the associations of the Right, including those of the Grey Wolves, within a single federation for each country.

However, all the steps in this sense led to a failure due to the political and ideological differences among the Islamic organizations. At the present time, The Turkish rightist associations in Belgium are grouped in three different federations, including the Türk-Islam Federasyonu.

After this attempt's failure, the Turkish Embassy launched another initiative aimed at assuring itself control... at least on the religious activities of these associations of the Right. On December 29, 1982, the setting up of the "Türkisch Foundation for Islamic Religious Affairs" (Türk İslam Diyanet Vakfı) was announced by the Turkish press. Among the founders of this foundation which groups all the mosques of different tendencies were the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Tayyar Altıkulaç, and several religious advisors of the Turkish embassies in Europe. The Turkish ambassador in Belgium, Faik Melek, was named honorary president. This foundation brought about the building of a religious center on Boulevard Général Jacques 38, 1050 Brussels, which cost it 18 million BF.

The inauguration of this center took place on May 11, 1985, before the Turkish Minister of State Kazım Oksay and leaders of three federations of the Right, including Salahattin Saygın, chief of the Grey Wolves in Belgium. During the ceremony, Oksay declared: "In the heart of Europe, within one of the most important Christian Communities in the world, you carry on activities to promote our values. All the other ideas are inferior in comparison to ours and

they are condemned to disappear in the future while Islam will live forever."

Given that the Grey Wolves are the most powerful compared to the others, it is quite evident that this new foundation and the other associations, forming a part, will be strongly influenced by the fascist propaganda of the Türk-Islam Federasyonu.

Thus, if one speaks of a true threat from abroad, notably Turkey, one must first take account of the growing threat of the Grey Wolves. Curiously in the Belgian press, after the demonstration against the American raid on Libya, there was much mention of, among others, the *Süleymançı*, but not a word about the Grey Wolves, who spread not only fundamental but also racist and chauvinist doctrines among the Turkish population.

Moreover, the Turkish regimes counts on this neo-fascist movement to lock Turkish immigrants in their cultural ghettos, whose growing development comes from lack of a true policy of integration in the host countries.

Belgium, among these countries, holds a particular position because it is the country which has recognized the Islamic faith for the first time in Europe. But this hasty recognition was not accompanied by structuration corresponding to the realities of this country. The Belgian government, instead of creating a structure excluding fundamentalist threats, privileged the Islamic Cultural Center of Belgium as the body to speak with. This is a center which was established with funding from Islamic countries and directed by a Council constituted by the ambassadors of the same countries, including Turkey.

Certain steps contesting the CICB privileges, taken by immigrant permanent residents of the Belgian unions and Belgian personalities, such as the association of "Islamic Religion and Culture" (CRI), have ended in failure for reasons detailed in the following article.

Thus, Turkish Muslim immigrants have become hostages of the Ankara regime, on one hand, and the neo-fascist movement, on the other. The mass-media which raised a cry about the demonstration against the American raid, do not wish to see the true threat which develops within the Turkish Community.

THE FAILURE OF THE "CRI" INITIATIVE

"The institutional hegemony exercised by the Islamic Cultural Center with regards to Islam's territorial administration in Belgium has been contested several times and has even given rise to attempts to create counter-powers. The oldest led to the creation in 1977 of a non-profit association, *Islamic Culture and Religion* (CRI), founded by 124 people - Belgians, Turks and Moroccans - whose objective is to promote, in respect for its pluralism and diversity, Islamic culture and religion. This association results from a double need: to oppose, on one hand, the hegemony of the Centre and especially, on the other hand, its liaison and dependence vis-à-vis the migrants' countries of origin, particularly Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia. The political opponents of these States fear, in fact, their possible control on immigration by means of mosque and religious teachers. It is in the matter of teacher's designation that CRI especially appears to wish to react. This privileged interest is due, moreover to the relative "secular" concerns of members of the association and thus to their relative distance vis-à-vis the world of the mosques. It is the cultural dimension of Islam rather than its religious dimension which is thus at the centre of these concerns. Pushing aside the designation (by a relatively marginal procedure) of some teachers of Islamic religion in school, this association does not act effectively and has not achieved results with regards to the acquisition of a solid institutional position." (F. Dassetto - A. Bastenier, *L'Islam Transplanté*, EPO Editions, 1984, pp. 183-4).

In fact, this association which, in its statutes, repudiates all form of clerical hierarchy, had been formed with the active support of two Belgian trade unions and its administration had been given to Turkish and Moroccan officials belonging to them.

However, in spite of this union support, the officials of this association have not only never taken initiatives to prevent the recruiting of Muslim immigrants by extreme-rightist movements or by repressive Turkish or Moroccan regimes but they also have never cared to hold a general assembly to develop, at least, reflection on this subject, and this since 1977, while their statutes stipulate a general assembly each year in the month of October.

In contrast, it has clearly been proved, thanks to several complaints lodged by members of Turkish and Moroccan communities, that certain members of the Administration Council, elected right at the start, in 1977, might have abused the name of CRI for personal use, out of the knowledge of the association's other members.

To help Moslim immigrants in Belgium, the Royal Decrees of July 10, 1952, and May 11, 1971, had foreseen the designation of religious or moral counsellors and putting funds at their disposal. It was recently discovered that certain union officials, who are also among the founders of CRI, and imposed themselves as religious or moral counsellors over the years have touched additional indemnities, that without ever having done any function incumbent to this remunerated post.

Moreover, they made designated their friends as "religious or moral counsellors", always employing them in functions which have no relationship to those which are provided for in the royal decrees.

After several complaints from two Moslim communities, the Executive of the French-speaking Community of Belgium (MCF) had to modify the modality for the attribution of "religious or moral counsellor" posts.

According to this new decree, Islamic religious advisors would be designated by the Minister on proposal from associations representing Islamic communities. Furthermore, they would be granted indemnities through non-profit associations whose names are always proposed by associations representing Islamic communities.

A recent complaint with the Royal Prosecutor has given evidence of the fact that these posts of religious or moral advisors are still occupied by a certain number of CRI officials or their associates because the MCF always considers CRI as the association representing Islamic communities.

It is still CRI which proposes to the MCF the non-profit associations to which will be attributed new moral or religious counsellors. Evidently, they are non-profit associations established by the same officials of CRI.

This new abuse has resulted in new spiritual confusion in Moslim communities. The irregular situation and the repeated abuses of CRI have been denounced by victims of these fraudulent practices.

Thereupon, certain founders of CRI required the authors of these practices to convene an extraordinary general assembly in 1985. To observers' great surprise, this assembly was held with only the participation of ten or so founders out of 124. This massive absence was either due to the fact that a great number of the founders was not convened or to disinterest by the founders in the fate of the Moslim community in Belgium.

So as to make one forget all the abuses and irregularities committed in the past, the Assembly General decided to dissolve CRI. An operation about which there has not been the slightest report in the mass-media, while the "threat of fundamentalism" and the possible means of fighting this threat cause a lot of ink to run.

After the dissolution, four of those mainly responsible for the irregularities and abuses pushed audacity to the point of forming, without the founders of the first CRI knowing, a new non-profit association with the same anacronym "CRI", to present it to the Ministry of Social Affairs of the French-speaking Community as a "representative and credible association" of the Islamic community. It is a mere game of words. While the first CRI was "Culture et Religion Islamique", the CRI stood for "Centre des Recherches Islamiques" (Islamic Research Centre).

All these manoeuvres have evidently been undertaken in view of continuing to benefit from funds destined mainly to help Moslim immigrants but illegally sidetracked for private and personal ends having no relation with the objectives of the decrees of 10/7/52 and 11/5/71.

The failure of "CRI" raises many questions concerning the intervention of Belgian organizations in Islamic affairs. What are the lessons to be drawn from the failure of this initiative? Can the secularist launch another initiative, while avoiding the mistakes committed in CRI's experience, in order to fight against the recruiting of Moslim immigrants by repressive regimes of the countries of origin or by extreme-rightist movements?

One of the co-authors of "Islam Transplanted", Mr Felice Dassetto formulated his proposals thus: "1. First of all one note: the time lost has been considerable. If certain things were possible in 1976-78... they are less possible today.

"2. CRI wanted to bring together, in opposition to the Cinquantenaire Islamic Center, the seculars, Islamist militants and traditionalist of various origin. This alliance could not last a long time. Besides —and for me, this is the big question— it is important that the "seculars" explain their position, without playing on ambiguities (see the very name of the non-profit organization). A big debate should be started on "Islamic secularity" within the framework of "Islam Transplanted".

"3. One must make a finer analysis (but also more realistic) about what is the Cinquantenaire Islamic Centre and imagine new strategies in comparison to those imagined at CRI's foundation.

"4. I share your anxiety about the role of foreign States by means of embassies. The role of Turkey is particularly worrying as regards the covering of the Moslim population.

"I come back to my starting theme:

"Debate on Islamic questions and Administration of Moslims should come out of chancelleries of foreign States; it should become a topic to discuss and negotiate among the people who live in Belgium.

"Note that for me this concerns not only the administration of the Moslim religion but also the language courses and thus concerns Spain, Italy, etc., as well.

"5. Whatever new initiative that would become spokesman to the Belgian authorities should give serious guarantees of competence and organisation. This was not the case with CRI".