A non-government information service on Turkey
Un service d'information non-gouvernemental sur la Turquie


17th Year - N°193
November 1992
38 rue des Eburons - 1000 Bruxelles
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 Rédacteur en chef: Dogan Özgüden - Editrice responsable: Inci Tugsavul

    As State terror was being reinforced in Turkey, the European Communities raised its relations with Ankara to a higher level for the sake of “regional stability”
    Despite the on-going violations of human rights, the European Communities, in a common move of its all components, the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament, have recently adopted a compromising stand toward the Ankara regime. It seems that the only snag which remains in the improvement of the Turco-EC relations is the Cyprus Problem as if Turkey has already become a “democratic” country.
    In November, as the EC Council and Commission were raising their relations with Turkey to a higher level, the European Parliament adopted a rather moderate report and resolution, stressing Turkey’s strategic importance for the Community in the region and putting accent on the Turkish Government’s “good will” rather than its scandalous human rights record.
    First on November 9, the European Community and Turkey announced plans for closer dialogue at the highest level after a meeting of the Turkey-EC Association Council in Brussels. Nevertheless, the one-day meeting was not free of the spectre of the Cyprus problem. EC Foreign ministers led by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, who represented the EC’s rotating presidency, asked Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin for Ankara’s influence in resolving the Cyprus problem.
    Stressing that the status quo in Cyprus is unacceptable, Hurd said: “Turkey asks us questions on Bosnia-Hercegovina. We ask it questions on Cyprus. The Community supports efforts made by UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
    In a press release after the meeting, the Community stressed that there was every reason to intensify cooperation and develop relations with Turkey in accordance with the perspective defined in the Association Agreement.
    Although annoyed by the EC’s stand the Cyprus Question, the Turkish side seems satisfied with the decision to raise the level of dialogue and the Europe’s silence as regards the violation of human rights.
    Encouraged by this ouverture, Turkish Prime Minister immediately rushed to Europe and met EC term-chairman John Major in London on November 23 and EC Commission Chairman Jacques Delors in Brussels on November 24.
    After his visits, Demirel said: “I am leaving Brussels confirmed in my belief that there is no problem which the Community and Turkey cannot overcome together. I hope that this improved atmosphere and the visible momentum in Turco-EC relations will lead us to the full resumption of our relations of Association.”
    As a matter of fact, as well the European Parliament’s moderated stand towards the Turkish regime as the European Community’s decision to improve bilateral relations at a higher level is based on the following consideration taking part in the European Parliament’s Resolution adopted on November 20: “It is important that Turkey should remain an element of stability in a region marked by grave political and ethnic problems.”


    Info-Türk, in a press release it issued on the occasion of Demirel’s arrival to Brussels, criticized this attitude, by drawing the attention to the fact that the European Community is returning step by step to an accomplice of the Turkish regime’s crimes against the humanity:
    “Turkey remains at present one of the regional powers which carries on a bloody repression as regards grave political and ethnic problems.
    “The Turkish Army’s large scale operation in the Iraqi territory, which has led even the reaction of the Iraqi Kurds because of the bombing of Kurdish villages, is now taking as target the opposition forces of Turkey, as well Kurdish as Turkish.
    “The Turkish Army chiefs publicly advocate ‘annihilation of traitors and their support in the media, political parties and associations.’
    “The Turkish press is subjected to an unprecedented self-censorship, Kurdish deputies are prosecuted un the menace of capital punishment, books and newspapers confiscated, the regime’s opponents are physically liquidated by obscure forces protected by the Army. The number of assassinated journalists has already risen to twelve.
    “Amnesty International, in its report issued on November 9 says: ‘There has been too much talk and too little action on the part of the Turkish authorities. The Turkish Government has failed to fulfil pledges to improve human rights and political killings and torture in Turkey which continue unabated.’
    “The recent amendment of the Criminal Trial Procedures Law (CMUK), presented as a step forward ameliorates nothing in reality. The Human Rights Association of Turkey describes this new law as a step backward , because an opponent accused of committing crime against the State may be kept under police detention without his lawyer’s intervention for up to one month in the region of emergency and for fifteen days out of this region.
    “It means that torture will be carried out as before, particularly in this period of chauvinist hysteria marked by Demirel’s praises to the army and the police.
    “The recent European softening, particularly that of the European Community, as regards the Turkish regime is not of use in stability in the region; on the contrary, European authorities are turning step by step into accomplices of the crimes against the humanity which will no doubt make the instability in the region deeper and more irremediable.”


    The European Parliament’s report on Turkey, prepared Belgian Socialist Raymonde Dury, was finally discussed at the plenary session of the EC’s legislative body. As Ankara anticipated it, this “relatively favorable” report was, on November 20,  adopted  with some minor amendments. The most important of these amendment was linking closer ties between Turkey and the EC to the solution of the Cyprus problem.
    As regards the Turkish military operation in Northern Iraq, although several parliamentarians urged a firm reprisal of Turkey “for violating international law,” the accepted text only called on Turkey and the “the guerrillas fighting in southeast Turkey” to halt fighting.
    On November 17, during the first debate on the report, in a move to guarantee the approval of the Dury’s report without any change, Turkish officials in Ankara were mobilized sent telegrams to Strasbourg, saying the judicial reform package was about to receive Turkish Parliament’ approval.
    Although some EP members, referring to Turkey’s “bad human rights” record, wanted the resolution condemns it in strong language, the European Parliament refused the motion and was contented with saying in its resolution that Turkey step up measures against torture practices, lift its capital punishment laws, improve its dialogue with the Kurds and lift the emergency law rule in the Southeast.
    To satisfy Ankara, the highest European legislative, referring to the terrorism-human rights dilemma, used a harsher language as regards armed groups with the PKK at the top of the list.
    What is more, the European Parliament preferred to remain silent against the aggressive declarations made by Tunc Bilget, the co-chairman of the Turco-EC Joint Parliamentary Committee, as regards its precedent resolutions concerning the the repression in Turkey.
    The European Parliament had adopted, on September 17, two resolutions criticizing the Turkish security forces for executing 205 people without trial since the beginning of 1992 and for using the death of journalists as “a way to create censorship through fear.” After having received the decision, Tunc Bilget had accused the European Parliament in following terms: “In taking these decisions, the European Parliament have ignored the warnings made by the Turkish Parliament during the Istanbul meetings... and have attacked Turkey, once more, in a way to resemble the words of PKK.”
    Earlier, in the Istanbul meeting, held on June 29-30, Bilget had criticized the EP for its stance on the Newroz events and claimed that the EP was “at best curiously uninformed or misinformed in such a way as to lead us to suspect its motives.” (See: Info-Türk, N°191, Sept 92).

    The text of EP Resolution on Turkey

    The following is the text of the European Parliament’s resolution adopted on November 20 in Strasbourg:
    The European Parliament:
    A. whereas the operation of the various bodies set up under the 1963 Association Agreement was only recently normalized at the Association Council meeting of 30 September 1991,
    B. having regard to trade and economic relations with the European Community, which are particularly vital for Turkey, and the broad national consensus in Turkey on the country's links with Europe, as evidenced by the 1987 membership application,
    C. whereas Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe, a signatory to the Paris Charter of the CSCE, has just concluded an agreement with EFTA and is a member of NATO: whereas, therefore, Turkey is a signatory to several international pacts with which it must comply,
    D. having regard to the significant role which Turkey has always played and will inevitably have to play in settling the problems of the Near and Middle East, Asia Minor and the Caucasus owing to its position in Europe and in Asia, its interest in securing and consolidating peace in these regions and its determination to do so,
    E. whereas it is important that Turkey should remain an element of stability in a region marked by grave political and ethnic problems and welcoming the Turkish Government's positive attitude in the conflict between Azeris and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh,
    F. whereas it is in the interests of the European Community and of the United Nations that a balance be maintained between the regional powers in the Near and Middle East, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia,

    l. Considers that there is an urgent need to study and improve relations with Turkey;

    On Turkey’s application for EC membership

    2. Stresses that the Community has embarked on a new stage of integration with the imminent completion of the internal market and the establishment of an economic, monetary and political union as decided by the European Council at Maastricht on 8 and 9 December 1991 and set out in the Treaty signed on 7 February 1992 by the Heads of State and Government;
    3. Stresses that the rights and obligations attaching to a country's status as a Member State will henceforth be more considerable;
    4. Notes that the fundamental issue of the Community's future must be seen in the much broader context of the new European order;
    5. Draws attention, in this connection, to the various types of organization already in existence such as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the imminent establishment of a European Economic Area, and the Council of Europe;
    6. Points out that Turkey's application for membership must be placed in the wider context of general deliberations on the Community;
    7. Concurs, as regards Turkey's membership application, with the conclusions of the Commission's report and points out - without casting doubt on Turkey's eligibility to join the Community at some time in the future - that the membership issue is not the subject of this Resolution;
    8. Notes that Turkey does not at present fulfil the conditions necessary for membership, particularly those of a political nature, but acknowledges Turkey's determination to become progressively more integrated into European structures;
    9. Stresses, however, Turkey's importance as an economic, trading and political partner, and takes into consideration its cultural and religious diversity, which heightens the significance of its role as a bridge between Europe and Asia;

    The political and democratic situation

    10. Notes that the general election of 20 October 1991, which testified to the multiparty nature and political maturity of the Turkish regime, marked the beginning of a new era in the country's political history, under an electoral law which continues to restrict the right of political expression;
    11. Welcomes the Coalition Protocol between the True Path Party (DYP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) and their programme of government, which are intended as guarantees of the process of democratization to be implemented in the spirit of the Paris Charter and calls on the government to implement the announced reforms and acknowledge the Kurdish situation;
    12. Notes the coalition government's desire to complete the review of the 1982 Constitution, which is at present preventing the establishment of a constitutional democracy;
    13. Notes the adoption by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 21 May 1992 of the law amending the provisions of the Code of Penal Procedure, the law on the establishment and procedures of the State security courts, the law on the powers and functions of the police and the anti-terrorism law;
    14. Calls for the promotion and broadening of legislative measures, in line with the declared intention of the present Turkish Government to guarantee freedom of expression and association, reviewing penal law, detention procedures and the right to a legal defence, taking steps to abolish torture, abrogating certain provisions of the anti-terror law (of which Article 1 in particular poses a serious threat to democracy) and the law on police powers and responsibilities, and hopes that these draft laws will be quickly adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly;
    15. Welcomes the closure of Eskisehir prison, but deplores the continuing use of torture and detention of political prisoners, a general amnesty for whom, as called for by the human rights organizations, could create a climate of reconciliation between the state and its citizens;
    16. Appeals to the Turkish military and security forces, which still play a significant role in the country's political life, not to undermine the efforts of the coalition government, and to guarantee the right to life and put an immediate stop to the use of torture;
    17. Calls on Turkey to sign, ratify and abide by a number of international conventions, particularly the ILO Convention on the Protection of Workers' Rights (trade union rights), to ratify the conventions on children's rights and the equality of women, and to abolish capital punishment; welcomes the Turkish Government's declaration of 5 May 1992 in which it lifted its reservations to Articles 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights;
    18. Condemns the acts of terrorism, particularly those of the PKK, Dev-Sol and Hezbollah, perpetrated against innocent civilians;
    19. Acknowledges that the Turkish Government has a perfect right to combat terrorism provided that human rights are fully observed and the exercise of this right does not spark off a cycle of violence; points out in this connection that the Community has condemned the Turkish air force raids on Kurds in Iraq and the level of the Turkish military response against the population of Kurdish areas in Turkey which has resulted in death and injury to many innocent citizens;
    20. Calls on the Turkish Government to lift the state of emergency in the South     East of the country forthwith and to enter into a dialogue with the Kurdish people, with a view to a peaceful solution which will safeguard the rights of the Kurds, in the knowledge that any solution based on repression is doomed to failure from the outset;
    21. Encourages the government's planned campaign to educate the police and armed forces in human rights,
    22. Favours granting Community financial assistance to associations for the promotion and defence of human rights in Turkey in order to encourage their activities, particularly those of the rehabilitation centres for torture victims;
    23. Notes that no previous Turkish Government has paid proper attention to the Kurdish problem and that, on the contrary, acts of repression have been committed by successive governments against the Kurdish people;
    24. Is convinced that this situation has been one of the causes of the terrorism perpetrated by the PKK, a terrorist organization which it has always condemned and whose actions will only genuinely serve the interests of the Kurdish population when they become non-violent ;
    25. Notes that the new government intends to respect the cultural identity of the Kurdish people as part of the process of establishing democracy and national unity;
    26. Considers that these specific rights should include the right to speak, write and publish in Kurdish, use Kurdish in courts of law and receive instruction in Kurdish and that this should be accompanied by a programme of economic measures that would really benefit the Kurds by promoting greater economic and social development in the South-East region, which, as a result of the problems confronting it (such as unemployment and illiteracy), provides particularly fertile ground for the development of terrorist activities;
    27. Wishes to see a situation in which all minorities in Turkey, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, are able to express their cultural identity without fear of repression or discrimination, and supports similar legitimate claims by Turkish minorities throughout the world;
    28. Calls for archaeological excavations to be carried out in advance, should new dams be constructed in South-East Anatolia, so as to preserve the traces of the cultures and civilizations which followed each other over the centuries on the Anatolian Plain; calls on the Member States of the European Community to bring this issue before the Council of Europe and UNESCO;
    29. Recalls its resolutions concerning, in particular, the Armenian question;
    30. Calls for the right of all citizens to profess and practise in public their religious convictions to be recognized and safeguarded by law;
    31. Highlights the oecumenical nature and pan-orthodox mission of the Patriarchate in Istanbul as the leading institution of Orthodoxy and hopes that measures can be taken in future to avoid actions which may undermine its dignity and authority;

    On the state of association

    32. Notes that since the resumption of association relations in 1989, as it recommended its above-mentioned resolutions of 15 September 1988 and 17 March 1989 - these relations having been broken off after the military coup d'état of 12 September 1980 - one of the association bodies (the Joint Parliamentary Committee) has been able to resume normal operation on the basis of three meetings per year, and is delighted that dialogue has thus been preserved between Members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the European Parliament; 
    33. Welcomes the Association Council meeting of 30 September 1991 - the first since the failed meeting of 26 April 1988 in Luxembourg - and hopes that this body will henceforth work constructively and find a way of resolving the existing economic, commercial and political difficulties between the two partners which were the subject of an Association Committee meeting on 6 December 1991;
    34. Notes that statistics show a substantial increase in trade, with, however, a considerable deficit on the Turkish side, and recalls that the European Community has made a significant effort to increase the export quotas of Turkish textiles to the European Community;
    35. Welcomes the recent signing of the cooperation agreement between the EC and Turkey in the medical and health field, the agreement on vocational training projects in the tourism and mining sectors and numerous other sectoral agreements;

    On the renewal of the association

    36. Is convinced that the renewal of the association is in both partners' interests;
    37. Recalls that the problem of the Republic of Cyprus - one of the unresolved political conditions of accession - affects relations between the Community and Turkey and recalls the Community's unwavering stance - expressed at various European Council meetings, particularly the Dublin Council of April 1990, and in Parliament's resolutions - in favour of restoring the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and the withdrawal of the Turkish occupying army in accordance with United Nations resolutions;
    38. Refers to the Council declaration of 24 June 1975:
    'It is in the Community's interests to maintain and develop close association relations with Turkey and Greece's application for EC membership must not affect EC-Turkey relations or rights based on the agreement concluded between the EC and Turkey';
    and the declaration of 26 June 1990:
    'The European Council discussed the Cyprus question in the light of the impasse in the intercommunal dialogue.
    'The European Council, deeply concerned at the situation, fully reaffirms its previous declarations and its support for the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions. Reiterating that the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations and bearing in mind the importance of these relations, it stresses the need for the prompt elimination of the obstacles that are preventing the pursuit of effective intercommunal talks aimed at finding a just and viable solution to the question of Cyprus on the basis of the mission of good offices of the UN Secretary-General, as it was recently reaffirmed by Resolution 649/90 of the Security Council';
    39. Notes the joint declaration issued in Davos in February 1992 by the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey concerning a treaty of friendship between the two countries, and their encouragement of the efforts by the UN Secretary-General to convene an international summit with the aim of restoring Cypriot unity;
    40. Is convinced that the democratization of Turkey is directly linked to a solution to the Cyprus problem;
    41. Recalls that the Commission's opinion on Turkey's application for EC membership was accompanied by a draft proposal, known as the 'Matutes package' (June 1990), the aim of which was to promote the renewal and further development of the association and to support cooperation in general and the stepping up of political dialogue;
    42. Recalls the philosophy of the Community's revamped Mediterranean policy, which provides for an increase in. aid to its Mediterranean partners, while respecting the development aims and priorities which they have set for themselves and taking into consideration the specific problems of each;
    43. Recalls its resolution of 12 July 1991 on the revamped Mediterranean policy, and in particular paragraphs 1, 2 and 11;
    44. Notes that all the northern and southern Mediterranean countries are currently receiving financial aid from the Community whether they are linked to the Community by association agreements (as is the case with Cyprus and Malta) or by cooperation agreements (as is the case with Syria and Algeria);
    45. Hopes that the problems which prevent Turkey from being treated on an equal footing with the above partners of the EC will be resolved as soon as possible;
    46. Urges the Council to take the same stance on Turkey as on the Mediterranean countries, provided the announced reforms and democratization have in fact been carried out and the Turkish occupying forces have withdrawn from the Republic of Cyprus as part of a fair and lasting solution to the Cypriot problem, in accordance with the UN re.solutions;
    47. Recommends, in the short term, the implementation of a number of specific measures to improve relations;

    In the economic and commercial field

    48. Hopes that the Turkish authorities will make efforts to resolve the problem of counterfeits, which have a far from insignificant impact on trade with the Community, put a stop to a number of dumping practices, fulfil their obligations under the Treaty of Ankara, particularly as regards Community agricultural exports to Turkey and honour their undertakings to dismantle customs duties and abolish charges having equivalent effect;
    49. Proposes, moreover, that  point ventures between Community and Turkish undertakings be encouraged and, to this end, supports the organization in the near future of a number of EC Turkey trade weeks;
    50. Hopes that Turkey will take the necessary measures to create a climate favourable to investments by Community undertakings;

    In the field of culture. information and the environment

    51. Hopes that Turkish students .and civil servants will be able to take advantage of scholarships offering the opportunity to learn about the European Community (Robert Schuman scholarships or the European Community visitors' programme) and welcomes the Commission's recent proposals to this effect;
    52. Believes that Turkey should be able to take advantage of the Erasmus programme as regards student mobility and increased cooperation between universities, which would make a positive contribution to the mutual understanding of each other's culture, religion and mentality;
    53. Believes that, in view of the huge size of the country, the opening in Istanbul and Diyarbakir of two branches of the European Community's delegation (currently based in Ankara) would provide an important stagingpost for information and cooperation with the European Community;
    54. Believes that Turkey must sign and ratify international agreements on the environment to which the Community is already a party, such as the 1979 Convention on migratory species of wild animals and the 1974 Convention on the prevention of marine pollution from land-based sources;
    55. Considers that discussions between the European Parliament and Turkey should deal, inter alia, with major projects and their impact on the environment;

    Freedom of movement for workers:

    56. Calls on the Commission and the Council to re-examine the question of freedom of movement for workers in the new economic situation in the Community and Turkey and to arrange for Turkish workers already resident in the Community and/or working in Turkey to enjoy freedom of movement pursuant to Article 48 of the EEC Treaty;

    Political dialogue:

    57. Places particular emphasis on the value and importance of political dialogue between the European Community and Turkey; gives every encouragement to relations between the corresponding parliamentary committees, exchanges of information between the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and further work in the joint parliamentary committee;
    58. Calls on the Association Council also to debate political issues of mutual interest to the two parties, such as, at the moment, issues concerning Iraq, the situation in the Near and Middle East, the problems in the Caucasus and security in the Mediterranean region, and the Cyprus problem, without the latter issue encroaching on the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations; supports, in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, observer status for Turkey in the Western European Union;
    59. Notes the creation, on 3 February 1992 in Istanbul, of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council uniting, under the aegis of Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldavia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine; hopes that this cooperation forum will promote stability in the region and foster the development of relations between the states signatory to the agreement on an equal footing;
    60. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, European Political Cooperation and the Turkish Government and Grand National Assembly.

    Just after the operation in Iraqi territory, the Turkish Army is carrying out preparations for a repressive campaign within Turkey. The units withdrawn from Iraq are now being concentrated along the Turkish side of the border.
    Chief of General Staff Dogan Güres said on November 18 that the upcoming operation would not be limited to the Southeast only. “The Army has highly trained and sophisticated anti-terror units. We are ready to deal all terrorist organizations throughout the country a heavy blow. Turkey is great country which will enter the 21st century as a considerable force. No terrorist organization can ever hinder its development,” he added.
    Turkish newspapers reported on November 16 that, starting off on the Cudi mountain range which continues into Iraq, troops are to crack down on the Kurdish guerrillas in a stage-by-stage, massive wipeout which is expected to also effect settlements such as Cizre, Slopi, Nusaybin on the border and hundreds of mountain villages.
    The region of Botan, described by the PKK as “the center of the revolutionary movement” is expected to be among the main targets.
    According top the daily Hürriyet, the Turkish-Iraqi border hereafter will not be a border of concrete division between the two countries but a “flexible border” where both Turkish troops and the Peshmergas will remain for security purposes. Even after the Turkish withdrawal, troops will remain in the former buffer zone with Iraq. The Turkish border may advance some 10 kilometers into Iraqi territory.
    The Turkish military say that the only threat can come from the Iranian border. For preventing any PKK assault from Iran or Syria, Turkey invited the foreign ministers of both countries to Ankara. Bothered by the proclamation of self-government by the Iraqi Kurds, both Iran and Syria seem in a tactical understanding toward the Turkish operation in Iraq.
    Satisfied with the  moderate reaction of Europe against the Army’s operation in Iraq, the Turkish military and civil leaders openly declare that they will annihilate not only the PKK guerrillas in the country, but also their support in the media, political parties and organizations.
    As disclosed by the Kurdish deputies, many Kurdish villages are being evacuated or destroyed, all suspects detained or deported. What is more, the ethnic enmity in the towns inhabited by Turks and Kurds is being systematically provoked by the hard-liners in the administration and army.    
    On November 2, in the northeastern provincial capital of Igdir, a demonstration by Kurdish people in protest against the Iraqi Operation was immediately retaliated by the Turkish majority, by wounding many Kurds, destroying about 200 workshops and 300 vehicles. The 36,000 population of this province consists of about 20 percent Kurds and 80 percent Azeri Turks, who control Igdir’s rich agro-economy. After the incident military troops were deployed to the town and hundreds of Kurds were arrested. During the operation, many Turks shouting slogans praising the Army, police and State helped the security forces to capture Kurdish demonstrators.
    The most alarming of this anti-Kurdish histeria was observed in Istanbul on November 19, during the funeral of four policemen slain two days ago. Istanbul Governor Kozakcioglu issued the following appeal to the population: “Let everybody who calls himself a Turk and an Istanbulite come to funeral!” On this appeal, some 20,000 people marched with Turkish flags, singing the national anthem and chanting slogans such as “Nationalist Turkey!”, “Revenge! Blood for blood!”, “We want public executions”, “No to the judicial reform!”, “Down with Communists!”, “Down with Separatists!”, “Down with Human Rights!”, “Victory to Islam!”. Police car sirens accompanied the chanting.

    Eighteen Kurdish deputies of the People’s Labour Party (HEP), on November 12, launched an “indefinite hunger strike” to protest conditions in southeastern Turkey and attract international attention to inhuman developments in the region.
    As going on hunger strike, HEP chairman Ahmet Türk said that they would not participate in the functions of Parliament during the hunger strike. In a nine-page communique, HEP deputies said: “To be equal before all laws, Kurds are forced to accept the Turkish identity. With a Kurdish identity, a person can only be a prisoner and suspect in Turkey. While the state denied the Kurdish national question a solution, it chose violence as a principle policy. The state forces are treating the local residents as potential enemies.”
    Followings are the highlights of the communique:
    • A total of 250 people were murdered by unidentified gunmen in Southeast Turkey and that villages were being destroyed.
    • 103 demonstrators were killed by security forces in March (Newroz), and similar campaigns have continued since then.
    • 30 people died and many others were wounded when the provincial center of Sirnak was ripped apart with gunfire and bombing on August 18. Although many innocent people were taken to court, all were released after the first hearing. Similar attacks continued in Dargecit, Mardin and in Kulp.
    • On October 3, the town of Kulp was sprayed with bullets, many vehicles and buildings were destroyed and burned down.
    • Hebler (Hisar) and Shah (Caglayan) villages in Cizre were evacuated by security forces in early October.
    • Securtiy forces sprayed the city center of Varto after a brief attack on the local security center on October 10.
    • On October 19, military troops entered the Güza village of Dargecit, Mardin. The troops demanded that villagers show them PKK shelters in the region, and when they refused, nine were detained, three were later found dead near the village.
    • The Kaledibi village in Hani, Diyarbakir, was bombed and later pulled to the ground by tanks by security forces on October 20. Three villagers were executed on the spot. Following a PKK attack on a military station in the Bogazköy village of Dicle, Diyarbakir, all of the building except for the houses of village guards were burned.
    • Hamlets of the Karsiyaka village of Batman, the Kaynak hamlet of Mardin and the Küllü village of Erzurum were all sprayed with bullets by security forces during this period.
    • Latin-American type death squads kidnapped people from their houses, sometimes kill them on the street. They are taken under custody en mass, questioned and tortured.
    • State of emergency in eastern and southeastern Turkey is close to being constitution with its continued extensions by Parliament.


    In retaliation, Ankara State Security Court prosecutor Nusret Demiral announced on November 24 that he would appeal to Parliament to lift the immunities of 18 deputies so that he may put them on trial and demand a death sentence. “These people hold opinions which violate the indivisibility of the state and nation,” he said.
    The prosecutor charged that the communique, disclosed as the parliamentarians went on hunger strike, reflected the deputies held subversive opinions.
    Accused by Turkish human rights activists of being “thought-control police,” Demiral has already demanded death sentences for 15 executives of the HEP, accused having acted on behalf of the PKK during the party’s general convention.
    Demiral said that although the SSC prosecution was still investigating the alleged relationship between HEP and the outlawed PKK, he already decided that there was a connection.
    This notorious prosecutor, for years, has ordered the arrest of many journalists and public figures, the confiscation of many books and newspapers.
    Although the present government came to power with the promise of putting an end to such practices, Turkish newspapers reported in August 1992 that Demiral’s duty was to be extended for the third time, using the headline “No one could move Demiral from his seat.”


    The Turkish Parliament, on November 11, once again extended the State of Emergency in 10 provinces in east and southeast Turkey for a period of four months.
The provinces of Bingöl, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Van, Batman and Sirnak inhabited by Kurds have been first under martial law, later under state of emergency for over twelve years.
    Out  of 387 deputies present at the session, the decision was taken with a majority of 294 votes. 91 parliamentarians voted against the extension, while two votes were counted as invalid.
    Interior Minister Ismet Sezgin argued that the state of emergency could not be removed at a time when the PKK had reached the point of dissolution in the region.
    According to the Turkish Daily News of November 12, it now appears impossible to raise confidence in the state among the local people as long as this system prevails.
About 5 million people live in the Emergency Law region. The Regional Governor Ünal Erkan, alias “super governor,” has extraordinary powers at his disposal in an area where bans are much more than those in other parts of the country, and punishments are more sever. The super governor may decide, when he deems it necessary, to either unite or evacuate any villages or hamlets in the region.
    The super governor directs cooperation efforts in the region amongst state security forces, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), the Special War Command (Turkish Gladio), the village guards and Turkish Radio and Television (TRT). The opposition claims that the clandestine fundamentalist groups, such as the Hezbollah, operates in the region under the protection of the state of emergency authorities.
    The system of employing village guards was put into practice in 1985 and a total of 36 thousand villagers have been employed to fight the guerrillas. The cost of the village guards system on the Turkish economy in 1992 alone is as high as 772 billion TL (about 100 million Dollars). A recent survey on the issue has shown that with the money spent on village guards since 1985, Turkey could have opened 150 factories in the region, where unemployment is a major social problem.
    During the last vote, the DYP and SHP deputies, defended the extension. The SHP, despite the fact that it based its electoral campaign last year in the East on the promise of lifting the state of emergency, voted for the third time in favour of extension.


    The amendments made in Criminal Trial Procedures Law (CMUK) by the Turkish Parliament on November 18 , just before the vote on the European Parliament resolution on Turkey, was portrayed by the government as a new proof of democratization in the country. However, legal experts and lawyers unanimously agreed that the so-called “Judicial Reform Package” was no more than a window-show for the coalition.
    Despite its initial target for ensuring that all suspects would be saved from lengthy and painful interrogation as much as unwarranted punishment and its main goal of restoring Turkey’s credibility in the field of human rights, according to the text adopted by Parliament, twelve of the major reforms are not applicable to the suspects of crimes against the State. In fact, the draft has been changed by the hard-liners within the ruling DYP over months of lengthy debates which followed the President’s initial veto of the original bill on the military’s warning. The government, under pressure, agreed to amend the original bill, which came out differentiating between crimes committed by ordinary suspects and those committed against the regime. The left-wing of the coalition too, at the end, yielded to the pressure coming from the military and the DYP hard-liners.
    The Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD) and the Association for Contemporary Jurists (CHD) announced that not only did the amendments protect only ordinary criminals, but they also systemized torture for outlawed opponents of the regime, terrorist suspects and political offenders.
    The amendment has decreased detention period for ordinary suspects to 24 hours while in such crimes committed by more than two people, the period of custody may extended to four days.
    In cases related to so-called “terrorist suspects” though, the initial detention period has been set as 48 hours, which may be extended to 15 days in the case the crime is committed by a group.
    If such suspects are caught in the region of State of Emergency or in the provinces where there are State Security Courts, they will be held under custody for four days and in mass crimes, the detention period may be extended to 30 days.
    According to the new CMUK, suspects will have the right to be accompanied by lawyers while under police questioning but this right will not be applicable for “terror suspects,” again in the SSC and State of Emergency regions.
    What is more, “all” suspects already had this right under the previous law but it was not applicable since policemen in practice refused to allow suspects to summon or see their attorneys. What happened with the amendment was that this rights was tripped from “terror suspects” who, in Turkey, often consist of prisoners of conscience or political activists who have had no role in terrorism or armed activities.
    Besides, the new law authorized police to force testimonies from suspects without their consent while the former law denied to police the right to do so, which is actually a step backward.
    The CHD declared that while ordinary criminals are being spared harsh treatment or torture, persons detained because of alleged political crimes will be systematically tortured. Moreover, the IHD said: “Despite the fact that torture was long ago forbidden by Turkish law even before the passage of the new amendment, torture is still being widely practices in the country. Detainees mysteriously go missing. Fourteen people have lost their lives under police detention since the coalition came to power a year ago.”
    A limitation in the authority of SSCs has also come with the new bill. Accordingly, the SSC will only look after crimes of collective smuggling, narcotic smuggling and terrorism. Violations of the associations law and the wireless law will no longer be under SSC jurisdiction. Strikes, lockouts, collective agreements and freedoms related to meetings and rallies will also be out of SSC jurisdiction. In practice, however, legal experts say these courts will be as strong as ever and no change is expected in the controversial cases already in the hands of SSC tribunals.
    These courts will still be looking after crimes committees against the state or terrorism crimes. They will still be able to demand death penalties for parliamentarians only for making speeches against the indivisibility of the state and/or order the seizure of journals and books on grounds of containing separatist or anti-state propaganda.


    The pro-Islamic Welfare Party (RP) dealt a stunning blow to all other political parties at the partial elections held on November 1st, 1992 in 23 municipalities, by raising its votes to 24.52% from 17.05 in 1991.
    The biggest shock occurred in Istanbul where the RP took 26.95% of more than half a million valid votes cast and turned into the strongest political force of the biggest city of the country. In Istanbul, the main opposition Motherland Party (ANAP) came second with 24.43% as the coalition partners, Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP) and the Correct Way Party (DYP), stayed at the third and fourth ranks with respectively 17.31% and 14.24%.
    As for the ensemble of the municipalities where partial elections were held, the RP obtained 24.52% of the votes, it was followed by the ANAP (22.85%), SHP (19.15), DYP (16.68%) and Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DSP) (12.83%).
    The victory of the RP is generally considered as a reaction of the popular strata against the present situation in Turkey which is marked by a rapid deterioration of living conditions. Although the DYP-SHP coalition came to power last year with the promise of pulling down the inflation rate, the recent data showed that it, with 7O%, climbed over the rate of the ANAP period.
    The reports about the corruption and irregularities at the municipalities controlled by the coalition parties have pushed the population of slums to revolt and to replace them by RP candidates who claims that only the mayors attached to religious values can put an end to this situation.
    In political field, the RP has remained since the 1991 elections as the only parliamentary force leading an efficient opposition against the government’s repressive policies.
    The Turkish media’s recent frenzy of sensation and lottery, the pornographic  programmes of the new private televisions, the general upset of traditional moral values too have played an important role in the new political choice of conservative masses.
    But the most important factor was without any doubt the successful organisation and electoral campaign led by the RP at popular quarters while the other parties were failing to show a vitality and credibility.
    After a series of shifts between political parties in the Parliament to detriment of the SHP, this result of the partial elections has shown that the future of the present government is not certain and Turkey may find itself at any moment in a new political crisis. 
    Although some political observers claim that Turkey may be a second Algeria in near future, it is too early to attribute a FIS image to the RP, because the latter has already been an integrated part of Turkish political system for over twenty years and took part few times in coalition governments, even once with Ecevit’s social democrat CHP.
    Nevertheless, despite its anti-imperialist and anti-American rhetoric, it is also well known that the RP has close religious, political, economic and financial relations with Saudi Arabia, the champion of Islamic fundamentalism and the closest ally of the USA in the Islamic world. RP leader Necmeddin Erbakan always speaks of replacing the secular order by an Islamic order and attacks very often the European Community and qualified it as the fifth column of the Zionism.
    So, it should never be ignored that the RP, encouraged by the growing popular support, may adopt in future a more radical fundamentalist stand and lead the country to the Saudi model. What is more, with its political power in Turkey, it may play a bigger role in imposing Islamic fundamentalism to the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union.


    As the European Community was improving its relations with Turkey, the biggest city of this country , on November 9, turned into scene of an unprecedented book-hunting.
    The 11th Annual Book Fair, organized by TUYAP, was opened this year in Istanbul with the participation by over 250 publishing houses. However, the variety and enthusiasm at this year’s fair was marred when police raided the site to confiscate books they maintained were banned.
    Police teams from the Istanbul Security Directorate came to the fair to halt sales or display of some books, among them the books of sociologist Dr. Ismail Besikci, author of a number of works on the Kurdish question, and Musa Anter, the Kurdish journalist who had been assassinated in September. They also detained some publishers and two journalists who were trying to photograph the incident.
    The police raid was protested by visitors and those working at the stalls. Fair officials then called the Minister of Culture Fikri Saglar, who then called the police to tell them to release the publishers they had detained.
    Besikci’s publisher, Yurt Yayinlari, had long been notified that they were unauthorized to sell some of the scholar’s works. In protest, they had hung a bunch of the books bound with a chain from the ceiling; they were thus only displaying the books, not selling them. Police officers not only took those books, but also other books that were on display and for sale, already authorized by a court of law.
    The Human Rights Association booth at the fair protested the banning of books and also had a large display of the photographs of persons missing after they were detained by police.


    Parallel to pressure on the opposition press, the assassination of Kurdish journalists continued in November and the total number of the murdered journalists in ten months reached 12.
    First, on November 18, a former correspondent of the daily Hürriyet, Hatip Kapcak, was assassinated in the town of Mazidag, Mardin. Two days later, on November 20, the representative of the weekly Gercek, Namik Taranci was shot dead by unidentified gunmen.
    On these assassinations, the International Federation of Journalists, in a letter addressed to Prime Minister Demirel on November 23, said: “The IFJ is depressed to learn that another two Turkish journalists have been murdered in the South East of Turkey. On behalf of the 300,000 journalists which we represent throughout the world, we most formally protest against the on-going murders of journalists in Turkey and the complete impunity of the murderers. Today, Turkey holds the world record in the killing of journalists. We insist that your government take immediate measures to protect the lives of journalists in your country and to order serious enquiries and legal proceedings against those responsible for these killings.”


    The daily Cumhuriyet reported on November 24 that six and a half million copies of magazines had been seized by the security forces during the past six years. Since 1987, 461 issues out of 1,158 issues of 50 magazines that have appeared until now have been seized, and these are still being kept in the security department depots, according to the report.
    Hundreds of law suits have been filed against the editors of these publications seeking 440 years of prison sentences and about TL 3.5 billion ($500,000) of fines.